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Abstract
Since the beginning, quantum mechanics has raised major founda-
tional and interpretative problems. Foundational research has been
an important factor in the development of quantum cryptography,
quantum information theory and, perhaps one day, practical quan-
tum computers. Many believe that, in turn, quantum information
theory has bearing on foundational research. This is largely related to
the so-called epistemic view of quantum states, which maintains that
the state vector represents information on a system and has led to the
suggestion that quantum theory needs no interpretation. I will argue
that this and related approaches fail to take into consideration two
different explanatory functions of quantum mechanics, namely that of
accounting for classically unexplainable correlations between classical
phenomena and that of explaining the microscopic structure of classi-
cal objects. If interpreting quantum mechanics means answering the
question, “How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true?”,
there seems to be no way around it.
1 Introduction
Ever since it was proposed more than 80 years ago, quantum mechanics has
raised great challenges both in foundations and in applications. The lat-
ter have been developed at a very rapid pace, opening up new vistas in most
branches of physics as well as in much of chemistry and engineering. Substan-
tial progress and important discoveries have also been made in foundations,
1
though at a much slower rate. The measurement problem, long-distance cor-
relations, and the meaning of the state vector are three of the foundational
problems on which there has been and still is lively debate.
It is fair to say that foundational studies have largely contributed to
the burgeoning of quantum information theory, one of the most active ar-
eas of development of quantum mechanics in the past 25 years. Quantum
information is dependent on entanglement, whose significance was brought
to light through the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument [1]. The realization
that transfer protocols based on quantum entanglement may be absolutely
secure has opened new windows in the field of cryptography [2]. And the
development of quantum algorithms thought to be exponentially faster than
their best classical counterparts has drawn great interest in the construction
of quantum computers [3]. These face up extraordinary challenges on the
experimental side. But attempts to build them are likely to throw much
light on the fundamental process of decoherence and perhaps on the limits
of quantum mechanics itself [4, 5].
Along with quantum information theory came also a reemphasis of the
view that the wave function (or state vector, or density matrix) properly
represents knowledge, or information [6, 7, 8]. This is often called the epis-
temic view of quantum states. On what the wave function is knowledge of,
proponents of the epistemic view do not necessarily agree. The variant most
relevant to the present discussion is that rather than referring to objective
properties of microscopic objects (such as electrons, photons, etc.), the wave
function encapsulates probabilities of results of eventual macroscopic mea-
surements. The Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics is taken as
complete, and its objects in no need of a realistic interpretation. Additional
constructs, like value assignments [9], multiple worlds [10], or Bohmian tra-
jectories [11] are viewed as superfluous at best.
Just like foundational studies have contributed to the development of
quantum information theory, many investigators think that the latter can
help in solving the foundational and interpretative problems of quantum
mechanics. A number of proponents of the epistemic view believe that it
considerably attenuates, or even completely solves, the problems of quantum
measurement, of long-distance correlations, and of the meaning of the state
vector. Their arguments will be briefly summarized in Sec. 2. I will then
argue, in Sec. 3, that the epistemic view and related approaches fail to take
into consideration that quantum mechanics has two very different explana-
tory functions, that of accounting for classically unexplainable correlations
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between classical phenomena, and that of explaining the microscopic struc-
ture of classical objects. In Sec. 4, I will ask the question of what it means to
interpret quantum mechanics, or any scientific theory for that matter. Draw-
ing from the so-called semantic view of theories, I will argue than interpreting
quantum mechanics means answering the question, “How can the world be
for quantum mechanics to be true?” I will conclude that so construed, an
interpretation can hardly be dispensed with.1
2 The epistemic and related views
Let us first examine the arguments that advocates of the epistemic view offer
to solve the foundational and interpretative problems of quantum mechan-
ics. I should point out that they do not all attribute the same strength and
generality to these arguments. Some advocates believe that the problems
are completely solved by the epistemic view, while others are of the opin-
ion that they are just attenuated. This distinction, however, is not crucial
to our purpose, and I will simply give the arguments as they are typically
formulated.
The first problem that is addressed by the epistemic view is the one of the
interpretation of the state vector (or state operator, or wave function). As
the name suggests, the state vector is normally interpreted as representing
the state of quantum systems. It is a matter of debate whether the state
it represents pertains to an individual system or to statistical ensembles of
systems [15]. But the epistemic view, which goes back at least to writings of
Heisenberg [16], claims that it represents neither. It denies that the (in this
context utterly misnamed) state vector represents the state of a microscopic
system. Rather, it represents knowledge about the probabilities of results of
measurements performed in a given context with a macroscopic apparatus,
in other words, information about “the potential consequences of our exper-
imental interventions into nature” [8]. This is often set in the framework of
a Bayesian approach, where probability is interpreted in a subjective way.
The epistemic view also addresses the notorious measurement problem.
Broadly speaking, the problem is the following. Suppose we want to describe,
in a completely quantum-mechanical way, the process of measuring a physical
quantity Q pertaining to a microscopic system. For simplicity, assume that
1This paper reformulates the arguments made in [12], [13], and [14], where additional
material can be found.
3
the spectrum of Q is discrete and nondegenerate, and that the normalized
eigenvector |qi〉 corresponds to the eigenvalue qi. The measurement appa-
ratus should then also be considered as a quantum system, which comes to
interact with the microscopic system. Let |α0〉 denote the initial state of the
apparatus. The interaction will represent a faithful measurement of Q if the
combined system evolves like
|qi〉|α0〉 → |qi〉|αi〉, (1)
where |αi〉 represents a state of the apparatus wherein the pointer shows the
value αi (with αi 6= αj if i 6= j).
If the Schro¨dinger equation is universally valid, the combined evolution
of the microscopic system and macroscopic apparatus is unitary (assuming,
unrealistically, that they form together a closed system). But then, an initial
state involving the superposition of several eigenstates of an observable of
the microscopic system evolves into a final state involving a superposition
of macroscopically distinct states of the apparatus (or of the apparatus and
environment in more realistic situations). Explicitly,{∑
i
ci|qi〉
}
|α0〉 →
∑
i
ci|qi〉|αi〉. (2)
One solution to this problem appeals to the collapse of the state vector [17],
in which the Schro¨dinger equation breaks down and only one term of the
macroscopic superposition (e.g. |qj〉|αj〉) remains.
How does the epistemic view deal with the measurement problem? It does
so by construing the collapse of the state vector not as a physical process,
but as a change of knowledge [18]. Insofar as the state vector is interpreted
as objectively describing the state of a physical system, its abrupt change
in a measurement implies a similar change in the system, which calls for
explanation. If, on the other hand, and in line with a Bayesian view, the
state vector describes knowledge of conditional probabilities (i.e. probabil-
ities of future macroscopic events conditional on past macroscopic events),
then as long as what is conditionalized upon remains the same, the state
vector evolves unitarily. It collapses when the knowledge base changes (this
is Bayesian updating), thereby simply reflecting the change in the conditions
being held fixed in the specification of probabilities.
A third problem which is addressed by the epistemic view is the one of
long-distance correlations [8, 19]. Consider the realization of the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen setup in terms of two spin 1/2 particles (labelled A and B),
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where the state vector |χ〉 of the compound system is an eigenstate of the
total spin operator with eigenvalue zero. In this case
|χ〉 = 1√
2
{|+;n〉 ⊗ |−;n〉 − |−;n〉 ⊗ |+;n〉} . (3)
Here the first vector in a tensor product refers to particle A and the second
vector to particle B. The vector |+;n〉, for instance, stands for an eigenvector
of the n-component of the particle’s spin operator, with eigenvalue +1 (in
units of ~/2). The unit vector n can point in any direction, a freedom which
corresponds to the rotational symmetry of |χ〉.
Suppose Alice measures the n-component of A’s spin and obtains the
value +1. Then she can predict with certainty that if Bob measures the
same component of B’s spin, he will obtain the value −1. If the state vec-
tor represents the objective state of a quantum system, it then seems that
B’s state changes immediately upon Alice’s obtaining her result, and this no
matter how far apart A and B are. Since the word “immediately”, when
referring to spatially separated events, is not a relativistically invariant con-
cept, such a mechanism is not easy to reconcile with the theory of special
relativity.
In the epistemic view, what changes when Alice performs a measurement
is Alice’s knowledge. Bob’s knowledge will change either if he himself per-
forms a measurement, or if Alice sends him the result of her measurement by
conventional means. Hence no information is transmitted instantaneously,
and there is no physical collapse on an equal time or spacelike hypersurface.
Related to the epistemic view is the idea of genuine fortuitousness [20, 21],
a radically instrumentalist view of quantum mechanics. The idea “implies
that the basic event, a click in a counter, comes without any cause and thus
as a discontinuity in spacetime” [21, p. 405]. Indeed
[i]t is a hallmark of the theory based on genuine fortuitousness
that it does not admit physical variables. It is, therefore, of a
novel kind that does not deal with things (objects in space), or
measurements, and may be referred to as the theory of no things.
(p. 410)
Such approaches to the interpretation of quantum mechanics are to be
contrasted with realist views like Bohmian mechanics [11]. Here particles
are taken to exist and they follow deterministic trajectories. For illustration,
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consider a set of N nonrelativistic spin-zero particles interacting through
a potential. The system’s wave function is a solution of the Schro¨dinger
equation. We can write it in polar form as
Ψ(r1, . . . , rN , t) = ρ exp(iS/~). (4)
The equation of motion of particle i is given by
mivi =∇iS. (5)
In general, S is a nonadditive and nonseparable function of all particle coordi-
nates ri. This can be shown to account for nonlocal effects like long-distance
correlations.
In Bohmian mechanics, the statistical properties of quantum mechanics
arise from an incomplete knowledge of the system’s initial conditions. In-
deed the particles’ initial positions, although well-defined, are “hidden” to
any observer. What is known is their statistical distribution, taken to be
proportional to the absolute square of the wave function. It can be shown
that Bohmian mechanics exactly reproduces the statistical results of quan-
tum mechanics. In particular [22], interference fringes in Young’s two-slit
setup follow directly from (5).
If Bohmian mechanics exactly reproduces the statistical results of quan-
tum mechanics, aren’t the trajectories superfluous, and shouldn’t they be
discarded? The analogy has been made between such trajectories and the
concept of the ether prevalent at the turn of the twentieth century [23, 24].
H. A. Lorentz and his contemporaries viewed electromagnetic phenomena as
taking place in a hypothetical medium called the ether. From this, Lorentz
developed a description of electromagnetism in moving reference frames, and
he found that the motion is undetectable. Following Einstein’s formulation
of the electrodynamics of moving bodies, the ether was recognized as playing
no role, and was henceforth discarded. So should it be, according to most
proponents of the epistemic view of quantum states, with interpretations of
quantum mechanics that posit observer-independent elements of reality like
Bohmian trajectories. They predict no empirical differences with the Hilbert
space formalism, and therefore should be discarded.
3 Two explanatory functions
To examine how appropriate are the epistemic and related views of quantum
mechanics, it is important to properly understand the explanatory role of
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quantum mechanics as a physical theory. Although all measurements are
made by means of macroscopic apparatus, quantum mechanics is used, as
an explanatory theory, in two different ways: it is meant to explain (i) non-
classical correlations between macroscopic objects and (ii) the small-scale
structure of macroscopic objects. That these two functions are distinct is
best shown by contrasting the world in which we live with a hypothetical,
closely related one.
Roughly speaking, the hypothetical world is defined so that (a) for all
practical purposes, all macroscopic experiments give results that coincide
with what we find in the real world, and (b) its microscopic structure, if
applicable, is different from the one of the real world. Let us spell this out
in more detail.
In the hypothetical world large scale objects, i.e. objects much larger than
atomic sizes, behave just like large scale objects in the real world. The tra-
jectories of baseballs and airplanes can be computed accurately by means
of classical mechanics with the use of a uniform downward force, air fric-
tion, and an appropriate propelling force. Waveguides and antennas obey
Maxwell’s equations. Steam engines and heat pumps work according to the
laws of classical thermodynamics. The motion of planets, comets, and aster-
oids is well described by Newton’s laws of gravitation and of motion, slightly
corrected by the equations of general relativity.
Close to atomic scales, however, these laws may no longer hold. Except
for one restriction soon to be spelled out, I shall not be specific about the
changes that macroscopic laws may or may not undergo in the microscopic
realm. Matter, for instance, could either be continuous down to the smallest
scales, or made of a small number of constituent particles like our atoms. The
laws of particles and fields could be the same at all scales, or else they could
undergo significant changes as we probed smaller and smaller distances.
In the hypothetical world one can perform experiments with pieces of
equipment like Young’s two-slit setup, Stern-Gerlach devices, or Mach-
Zehnder interferometers. Let us focus on the Young type experiment. It
makes use of two macroscopic objects which we label E and D. These sym-
bols could stand for “emittor” and “detector” if it were not that, as we shall
see, they may not emit or detect anything. At any rate, E and D both
have on and off states and work in the following way. Whenever D is suit-
ably oriented with respect to E (say, roughly along the x axis) and both are
in the on state, D clicks in a more or less random way. The average time
interval between clicks depends on the distance r between D and E, and
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Figure 1: Shielding material prevents D from clicking
falls roughly as 1/r2. The clicking stops if, as shown in Fig. 1, a shield of a
suitable material is placed perpendicularly to the x axis, between D and E.
If holes are pierced through the shield, however, the clicking resumes. In
particular, with two small holes of appropriate size and separation, differ-
ences in the clicking rate are observed for small transverse displacements of
D behind the shield. A plot of the clicking rate against D’s transverse coor-
dinate displays maxima and minima just as in a wave interference pattern.
No such maxima and minima are observed, however, if just one hole is open
or if both holes are open alternately.
At this stage everything happens as if E emitted some kind of particles
and D detected them, and the particles behaved according to the rules of
quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, we shall nor commit ourselves to the exis-
tence or nonexistence of these particles, except on one count. Such particles,
if they exist, are not in any way related to hypothetical constituents of the
material making up D, E, or the shield, or of any macroscopic object what-
soever. Whatever the microscopic structure of macroscopic objects is, it has
nothing to do with what is responsible for the correlations between D and
E.
In a similar way, we can perform in the hypothetical world experiments
with Stern-Gerlach devices, Mach-Zehnder interferometers, or other setups
used in the typical quantum-mechanical investigations carried out in the real
world. Correlations are observed between initial states of “emittors” and
final states of “detectors” which are unexplainable by classical mechanics
but follow the rules of quantum mechanics. We assume again that, if these
correlations have something to do with the emission and absorption of parti-
cles, these are in no way related to eventual microscopic constituents of the
macroscopic devices.
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In the experiments just described that relate to the hypothetical world,
quantum mechanics correctly predicts the correlations between D and E (or
other “emittors” and “absorbers”) when suitable experimental configurations
are set up. In these situations, the theory can be interpreted in (at least)
two broadly different ways. In the first one, the theory is understood as
applying to genuine microscopic objects, emitted by E and detected by D.
Perhaps these objects follow Bohmian-like trajectories, or behave between
E and D in some other way compatible with quantum mechanics. In the
other interpretation, there are no microscopic objects whatsoever going from
E to D. There may be something like an action at a distance. At any
rate the theory is in that case interpreted instrumentally, for the purpose of
quantitatively accounting for correlations in the stochastic behavior of E and
D.
In the hypothetical world we are considering, I believe that both interpre-
tations are logically consistent and adequate. Of course, each investigator can
find more satisfaction in one interpretation than in the other. The epistemic
view of quantum mechanics corresponds to the instrumentalist interpreta-
tion. It simply rejects the existence of microscopic objects that have no
other use than the one of predicting observed correlations between macro-
scopic objects.
In the world in which we live, however, the situation is crucially differ-
ent. The electrons, neutrons, photons, and other particles that diffract or
interfere are the same that one appeals to in order to explain the structure of
macroscopic objects. Denying their existence, as is done in the approach of
genuine fortuitousness, dissolves such explanatory power. Denying that they
have states, as is done in the epistemic view, leaves one to explain the state
of a macroscopic object on the basis of entities that have no state.
4 Interpreting quantum mechanics
The epistemic and related views therefore fail to account for the second
explanatory role of quantum mechanics. To reinforce this conclusion, it is
instructive to investigate what it means to interpret a theory.
With most physical theories, interpretation is rather straightforward. But
this should not blind us to the fact that even very familiar theories can in
general be interpreted in more than one way. A simple example is classical
mechanics.
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Classical mechanics is based on a well-defined mathematical structure.
This consists of constants mi, functions ri(t), and vector fields Fi (under-
stood as masses, positions, and forces), together with the system of second-
order differential equations Fi = miai. A specific realization of this structure
consists in a system of ten point masses interacting through the 1/r2 gravita-
tional force. A hypothesis may then assert that the solar system corresponds
to this realization, if the sun and nine planets are considered pointlike and
all other objects neglected. Predictions made on the basis of this model cor-
respond rather well with reality. But obviously the model can be made much
more sophisticated, taking into account for instance the shape of the sun and
planets, the planets’ satellites, interplanetary matter, and so on.
Now what does the theory have to say about how a world of interacting
masses is really like? It turns out that such a world can be viewed in (at least)
two empirically equivalent but conceptually very different ways. The first one
consists in asserting that the world is made only of small (or extended) masses
that interact by instantaneous action at a distance. The second way asserts
that the masses produce everywhere in space a gravitational field, which then
locally exerts forces on the masses. These two ways constitute two different
interpretations of the theory. Each one expresses a possible way of making
the theory true (assuming empirical adequacy). Whether the world is such
that masses instantaneously interact at a distance in a vacuum, or a genuine
gravitational field is produced throughout space, the theory can be held as
truly realized.
Similar remarks apply to classical electromagnetism. The mathematical
equations can be interpreted as referring to charges and currents interacting
locally through the mediation of electric and magnetic fields. Alternatively,
they can be viewed as referring to charges and currents only, interacting by
means of (delayed) action at a distance [25].
In this respect, quantum mechanics seems different from all other physical
theories. There appears to be no straightforward way to visualize, so to
speak, the behavior of microscopic objects. This was vividly pointed out by
Feynman [26, p. 129] who, after a discussion of Young’s two-slit experiment
with electrons, concluded that “it is safe to say that no one understands
quantum mechanics. [...] Nobody knows how it can be like that.” But
the process of interpreting quantum mechanics lies precisely in taking up
Feynman’s challenge. It is to answer the question, “How can the world be
for quantum mechanics to be true?”
If we adopt this point of view (known as the semantic view of theo-
10
ries [27, 28]), we can understand the function of Bohmian trajectories or, for
that matter, of other interpretative schemes of quantum mechanics. Each
provides us with one clear way that the microscopic objects can behave so
as to reproduce the quantum-mechanical rules and, therefore, the observable
behavior of macroscopic objects. It is true that, just like the ether in special
relativity, they don’t lead to specific empirical consequences. But although
they could be dispensed with in the hypothetical world of Sec. 3, they cannot
in the real world unless, just like the ether was eventually replaced by the
free-standing electromagnetic field, they are replaced by something that can
account for the structure of macroscopic objects.
In all physical theories other than quantum mechanics, there are straight-
forward and credible answers to the question raised above, of “How can the
world be for the theory to be true?”. In quantum mechanics there are a num-
ber of answers, for instance Bohmian trajectories, multiple worlds, modal ap-
proaches, etc. None is straightforward, and none gains universal credibility.
Should we then adopt the attitude of the epistemic or related views, which
decide not to answer the question? I believe that, from a foundational point
of view, this is not tenable. For how can we believe in a theory, if we are not
prepared to believe in any of the ways it can be true, or worse, if we do not
know any way that it can be true?
5 Conclusion
The epistemic view of quantum mechanics is an attempt to solve or attenuate
the foundational problems of the theory. We have seen that it would succeed
if quantum mechanics were used only to explain nonclassical correlations
between macroscopic objects. But it is also used to explain the microscopic
structure of macroscopic objects. Interpreting the theory means finding ways
that it can be intelligible. A number of proposals go a long way towards this,
but much work remains to be done to make some of them sufficiently clear
and precise.
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